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ABSTRACT
I examine the relative informational efficiency of bonds and the underlying stocks
through the lead-lag relation between their daily returns. I find that stock returns lead
the returns of high yield bonds but not those of investment grade bonds, which indi-
cates that the stock market is relatively more informational efficient than the bond
market. The findings imply trading opportunities for the bonds that are highly sensi-
tive to the release of new information. I also find that stocks detect impending defaults
earlier than bonds, which implies that bond holders may have enough time to protect
their capital.
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Because bonds and stocks represent claims on the same corporate assets, financial theory suggests that, in a fric-
tionlessmarket, information that is relevant to theirmarket value should contemporaneously affect their returns.
However, if the stock market is more efficient than the bond market, stocks incorporate this information faster
than bonds. Therefore, stock returns should have predictive power for future bond returns, and the activities
of informed traders should lead to a lead-lag relation between the returns of the two securities. This lead-lag
relation between the returns of corporate bonds and those of the issuing firms’ stocks reflects how information
is incorporated into security prices and therefore the relative informational efficiency of bonds and stocks.
Differences in the level of informational efficiency of the two markets may be due to the different types of
investors that prevail in the two markets and the different informational environments. For example, the bond
market is typically dominated by sophisticated institutional investors who have faster access to relevant infor-
mation than individual investors who tend to prefer the stock market. Thus, institutional investors incorporate
relevant information faster than individual investors which implies that the bond market should be more infor-
mationally efficient than the stockmarket. On the other hand, there are significantly more financial analysts that
follow the stock rather than the bonds of a firm. Thus, more stock-related research is produced and disseminated
to the buy-side investors, compared to bond related research which is mainly limited to firms rated by credit rat-
ing agencies. Stock analysts tend to revise their recommendations about a firm more frequently compared to
the rating agencies that follow the same firm. Hence, stock prices should incorporate relevant information faster
than bond prices and the stock market should be more informationally efficient compared to the bond market.
Under both scenarios, a lead-lag relation between the returns of the two securities should be observed. Further, a
growing body of literature finds that stock markets may not integrate all available information instantly. Instead
information diffusion varies significantly across industries (e.g. Hong, Torous, and Valkanov 2007; Hou 2007).
Under this scenario, the lagging market has limited ability to fully incorporate the information reflected in the
leading market.
This study ismotivated by the different findings of prior research on the relative informational efficiency of the
debt and equity markets. Despite its size1 the corporate bond market is quite opaque, and as a result the studies
on the relative informational efficiency of the two markets are rather inconclusive. For example, Kwan (1996)
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uses the quotes of bond dealers fromMerrill Lynch to examine how information is incorporated into securities
prices. He finds that stock returns lead bond yield changes when incorporating firm-specific information, and
that stocks and bonds are driven by information that is mainly related to themean rather than the variance of the
value of the firm’s assets [similar results are reported by Blume, Keim, and Patel (1991) and Cornell and Green
(1991)]. Downing, Underwood, and Xing (2009) use intraday transaction data and find that the US corporate
bond market is less informationally efficient than the stock market, despite recent changes aimed at improving
transparency and reducing transaction fees in the bondmarket. Further, Gebhardt, Hvidkjaer, and Swaminathan
(2005) find that bond prices adjust slower than stock prices to information about changing default risk which
implies that stock returns have predictive power for bond returns. More recently, Hong, Lin, andWu (2012) use
transaction-based bond index data and report strong evidence that stock returns have predictive power for both
investment grade (IG) and high yield (HY) bond returns. However, Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) examine 55HY
US corporate bonds and find no evidence that the stock returns systematically lead the bond returns. Instead,
they argue that any contemporaneous relation between the stocks and the bonds is because of their joint reaction
to common factors. Ronen and Zhou (2013), use data from the US OTC corporate bond market to examine the
relative efficiency of stocks and bonds by taking into account liquidity patterns and institutional features. They
find that when the dynamic patterns of liquidity as well as trade size and timing effects are accounted for, stock
leads disappear and therefore the lack of agreement regarding the relative efficiency of the corporate bondmarket
can be reconciled. More recently, Bittlingmayer and Moser (2014) report that for the case of negative news, the
HY bonds are more informational efficient compared to stocks. The evidence is stronger for firms with volatile
stock returns, high coupon and short maturity bonds, and stocks with high prior abnormal return. Alexander,
Edwards, and Ferrin (2000), Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002), andDowning, Underwood, and Xing (2009) attribute
these conflicting findings to the opaque nature of the corporate bond market, the lack of comprehensive data,
different trading mechanisms, and to the complex relation between the returns of a firm’s stock and its publicly
traded debt.
In this paper, I use the daily returns of the Barclays bond indices (ex-Lehman Brothers bond indices) of a
wide spectrum of credit ratings and the underlying stock portfolios to examine the informational efficiency
of corporate bonds relative to stocks. For that reason, I use a bivariate vector autoregressions (VAR) model to
examine the lead-lag relation between the daily returns of the bonds and those of their underlying stocks. I
contribute to the literature because I use data from widely used benchmarks in the corporate debt market that
are made up of large samples of bonds; therefore, it is fairly safe to generalize my findings and inferences. More
importantly, I contribute to the literature because I examine the economic significance of my results for industry
practitioners. Specifically, I address the following two questions: Do daily stock returns lead daily bond returns
in reflecting common information? And do the empirical results have any economic significance for the market
participants?
The results about the relative informational efficiency of the bond and stock markets are likely to have an
impact on the decisions of rational investors. If, for example, stocks lead bonds then investors might choose to
buy (sell) a firm’s bonds after observing an increase (decrease) in the firm’s stock price. Investors are also likely
to face additional transactions costs in the less efficient market because of the greater variance in the pricing
error (i.e. deviations of the market price from the efficient price).2 Thus, traders might not be willing to trade
frequently and/or at large volumes because of the high implicit costs. The findings of this study are also of interest
to the debt issuing firms because in an informationally efficient market, they are likely to raise financing more
easily and less expensively. On the other hand, if the bond market is less informationally efficient relative to the
stock market, then it will be unappealing to investors. Thus, firms might have to sell their bonds at a significant
discount to tempt potential buyers.
My findings indicate that the daily stock returns lead the daily bond returns forIG, Aa, A, Baa, HY, Ba, B, and
Caa rated bond portfolios. But, the daily stock returns do not lead the daily bond returns for the safest (Aaa)
and least safe (Ca-D) bond portfolios. This finding indicates that the stock market is relatively more efficient
in incorporating common information. I also find that the market’s lead time for impending bond defaults is
shorter for the low rated bonds (i.e.HY, Ba, B, and Caa) than for the underlying stocks. This finding implies that
bond holders might have enough time to protect the value of their investments by working out of a long position
in HY bonds that are approaching default.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I describe the data set and the methods
used in this study. Section 3 presents the empirical results. In Section 4, I investigate the economic significance
of the empirical results; and in Section 5, I summarize and conclude the paper.
2. Data and summary statistics
2.1. Bond portfolios
My sample is based on the daily returns of a number of Barclays corporate bond indices. These are value-
weighted indices that cover a wide spectrum of credit ratings defined as the middle of the S&P, Moody’s, and
Fitch ratings; if a bond is rated only by two agencies then the lowest rating applies. They were formerly known as
the Lehman Brothers’ bond indices until Lehman’s collapse in 2008, after which Barclays acquired their North
American businesses. The use of the Barclays bond indices has a number of advantages. First, the Barclays indices
are commonly used benchmarks in the fixed incomemarket that offer both great breadth of coverage and length
of historical data. Second, the use of bond indices helps to mitigate problems related to non-synchronous data,
stale quotes, and extreme differences in liquidity in the bonds in my sample, which could affect the interpre-
tation of the observed lead-lag relations. Third, as noted by Ronen and Zhou (2013), in order to examine the
informational efficiency of the bond market it is important to differentiate between institutional and retail sized
bond trading. The use of the Barclays bond indices eliminates this problem because Barclays use bond quotes
only from institutional sized transactions. Fourth, Barclays price the majority of bonds that make up the indices
using a combination of model prices and traders’ prices, which could be actual transaction prices or actual bid
prices, instead of the less reliable matrix prices.3 Fifth, using portfolios of bonds is likely to diversify away most
of the unsystematic risk of the bonds that make up the indices. Lastly, the bonds included in the Barclays indices
need to satisfy certain criteria. In particular, the indices contain taxable corporate bonds with at least one year
left before maturity and a minimum of par value amount outstanding. Further, the bonds in the indices need to
have a minimum issue of $250 million and to state a coupon of fixed rate. In order to price the bonds, Barclays
makes the conservative assumption of no reinvestment of the interim cash flows. Finally, there is no maximum
number of constituents and the indices are rebalanced at the end of each month.
My sample includes the Barclays bond indices rated as Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, Caa, and Ca-D. I also add
two broad bond portfolios called IG, which comprises all of the bonds with at least Baa credit rating, and HY,
which comprises all of the bonds with a credit rating below Baa. Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics of
the bond indices across the spectrum of credit ratings used in my analysis. The table shows that the sum of the
bonds rated Baa and higher (3237) and the sum of the bonds rated below Baa (1566) are lower than the number
of bonds contained in the IG and HY bond indices respectively. This difference is because of the credit rating
Table 1. Characteristics of bond portfolios.

















01/02/1989 3560 6.45 11.33 5.93 7.14 711,712
Aaa 06/01/2000 67 4.46 10.13 6.25 5.26 632,897
Aa 01/01/2004 319 4.26 7.93 5.46 5.14 984,581
A 06/01/2000 1382 5.14 10.16 6.21 6.07 831,501
Baa 06/01/2000 1469 5.92 11.18 6.55 6.69 580,860
High yield (HY) 08/03/1998 1587 10.00 7.61 4.58 8.14 548,034
Ba 08/03/1998 551 7.94 8.27 4.91 7.69 600,551
B 08/03/1998 697 9.75 7.28 4.43 8.40 541,706
Caa 08/03/1998 268 14.69 6.91 4.22 8.49 470,177
Ca-D 08/03/1998 50 27.73 6.22 3.35 8.53 573,967
Note: Table 1 displays the daily average values for the characteristics of the Barclays bond indices. The ‘Start Date’ gives the date when the daily
data for a particular index became available. The ‘Number of Bonds’ gives the average number of bonds in an index. The ‘Yield’ gives the average
yield, ‘Years to Maturity’ gives the average time remaining to maturity, and the ‘Duration’ gives the average duration. The ‘Coupon’ gives the
average coupon, ‘Amount Outstanding’ gives the average market value of the bonds that remain outstanding, and the ‘Market Capitalization’
gives the average market capitalization of the bonds.
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migrations during the time periods in which the daily returns for these indices are available. The table also shows
that 67.4% of the 4803 bonds are rated Baa and higher and 32.6% are below Baa. The Baa rated bonds have the
longest average time to maturity with 11.18 years, and the Ca-D rated bonds the shortest with 6.22 years. The
yields of the bonds with higher credit ratings tend to be considerably lower than those of the bonds with lower
credit ratings. For example, the average yield of the Ca-D rated bonds is 27.73% while the average yield of the
Aaa rated bonds is 4.46%. The coupon also increases as the credit rating decreases, with the Ca-D rated bonds
offering the highest (8.53%) and the Aa rated bonds the lowest (5.14%) average coupon rates. Table 1 also shows
that the amount outstanding of the bonds with lower credit ratings is smaller than that of the bonds with higher
credit ratings. Further, bonds with a lower credit rating are issued by smaller firms with the average market
capitalization of an IG issuer being about 4.5 times larger than that of an HY issuer. Table 1 also indicates that
the starting date for each index varies from January 1989 to January 2004. Thus, the number of daily returns
available for the analysis of each index varies significantly.
2.2. Stock portfolios
I use the firm’s name and ISIN code from Thomson Reuters to match the constituents of the Barclays’ bond
indices to the stocks of the issuing firms and I then construct the underlying stock portfolios. These portfolios
are value-weighted using the same weights used to value-weight the respective bond portfolios. This is because
using different value-weights for the bond and stock portfolios based on the market values of the bonds and
stocks that make up these portfolios may lead to inconsistencies. For example, it is possible that one firm has
issued a huge amount of debt which implies that it would weigh heavily in the bond portfolio. However, its equity
might be nearly worthless and sowould have a considerable smaller weight in the stock portfolio. Using the same
weights for both the bond and stock portfolios helps to eliminate this potential inconsistency. Table 2 contains
the descriptive statistics of the associated stock portfolios. The matching process results in a total of 1431 firms
that have issued 4803 bonds. The number of matched firms indicates that many of them issued more than one
bond. The ratio of total liabilities over total assets discloses that the firms that issue bonds with low credit ratings
tend to be more leveraged compared to the firms that issue bonds with higher credit ratings. In addition, the
Altman’s z-score (Altman 1968), a measure of financial distress, indicates that lower leveraged firms of larger
size tend to have a lower probability of bankruptcy. These results are consistent with the credit rating of the firms
contained in the Barclays bond indices.
2.3. Returns for the bond and stock portfolios
The daily returns for bond indices and the associated stock portfolios are calculated as the percentage daily price
changes over the time periods in which the daily data are available. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for
Table 2. Characteristics of stock portfolios.





Investment grade (IG) 669 110,415 2.951 0.614
Aaa 3 262,821 4.533 0.459
Aa 31 820,442 3.320 0.576
A 226 85,997 3.156 0.597
Baa 472 222,466 2.681 0.632
High yield (HY) 626 24,905 1.896 0.720
Ba 228 52,869 1.901 0.674
B 324 4792 1.871 0.750
Caa 141 7055 1.944 0.812
Ca-D 6 14,154 1.033 0.863
Note: Table 2 displays the daily average values for the characteristics of the associated stock portfolios. The ‘Number of Firms’ gives the number
of firms that have issued the bonds in the associated bond indices. The ‘Market Capitalization’ gives the average market capitalization of the
issuers in each credit rating category. The ‘Altman’s z-score’ gives the Altman’s (1968) average measure of financial distress (z > 2.6 indicates
that a firm is in the safety zone, 1.1 < z < 2.6 indicates that a firm is in the grey zone, and z < 1.1 indicates that a firm is in the bankruptcy
zone). The ‘Total Liabilities/Total Assets’ gives the average ratio of the total liabilities and the total assets of the firm.
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the daily returns of the bond indices and the stock portfolios.
Mean (%) St. Dev. (%) Mean (%) St. dev. (%)
Credit rating Bonds (B) Stocks (S) ρB,S ρB,T
Investment Grade
(IG)
0.00 0.33 0.02 0.97 −0.117 (0.000) −0.673 (0.000)
Aaa 0.01 0.48 0.01 0.02 −0.003 (0.874) −0.650 (0.000)
Aa 0.00 0.33 0.02 0.93 −0.255 (0.000) −0.781 (0.000)
A 0.01 0.36 0.01 1.11 −0.245 (0.000) −0.748 (0.000)
Baa 0.01 0.37 0.01 1.33 −0.174 (0.000) −0.743 (0.000)
High yield (HY) 0.00 0.36 0.01 0.95 0.386 (0.000) −0.003 (0.869)
Ba 0.00 0.34 0.01 1.40 0.189 (0.000) −0.016 (0.323)
B 0.00 0.44 0.01 1.38 0.256 (0.000) −0.012 (0.467)
Caa 0.01 0.75 0.00 1.22 0.194 (0.000) 0.028 (0.091)
Ca-D 0.06 3.22 0.00 1.79 0.020 (0.225) 0.019 (0.254)
Note: Table 3 contains the descriptive statistics for the Barclays bond indices and the associated stock portfolios. For both the bond indices and
the stock portfolios, ‘Mean’ and ‘St. Dev.’ are the average daily return and the standard deviation of the daily returns, respectively. The ρB ,S is the
contemporaneous correlationbetween thebondand the stockdaily returns, andρB ,T is the contemporaneous correlationbetween thebondand
the 3-month Treasury note daily returns (the p-value of the null hypothesis that the estimated correlation is statistically equal to zero is given in
parenthesis).
the daily returns of the bond and the stock portfolios. As expected the mean daily returns for both the bond and
stock portfolios are close to zero with the exception of the mean daily return for the Ca-D rated bond index,
which has a daily return of 0.06%. However, this is also associated with a considerably higher standard devia-
tion; indeed, the risk increases as the credit rating of the bond indices decreases. Noticeable is that the correlation
coefficients between the returns of the high rated bond indices and the stock portfolios are negative, while that
correlation coefficients between the returns of the low credit rated bond indices and the stock portfolios are pos-
itive. Further, for the Aaa and Ca-D credit ratings the coefficients are statistically indistinguishable from zero.
For the HY rating category, the correlation between the bond and stock portfolio returns is positive and sig-
nificantly higher (0.386) than the correlation for the IG rating category (−0.117). These findings are expected
because the low credit rated bonds are closer to default, and their future cash flows, similar to the equity’s future
cash flows, are very sensitive to information related to the value of the firm and less sensitive to the movements
in interest rates. Thus, as Merton (1974) notes, the low credit rated bonds behave more similar to equity relative
to the higher rated bonds. On the other hand, the higher rated bonds have relatively stable future cash flows and
therefore a low correlation with stocks. Therefore, those bonds are affected more by the movements in interest
rates compared to the lower rated bonds. This argument is empirically supported by the correlation coefficients
between the bond indices and the returns of the 3-month Treasury notes reported in Table 3. For example,
the estimated correlation coefficients for the Aaa, Aa, A, and Baa rated bond indices are negative and very high
(−0.650,−0.781,−0.748, and−0.743 respectively). But for the Ba, B, Caa, andCa-D rated bond indices, the cor-
relation coefficients are very low and statistically indistinguishable from zero (−0.016, −0.012, 0.028, and 0.019
respectively).
3. Methodology and empirical results
3.1. Examining the lead-lag relation between the bond and the stock returns
If the bond and stock markets are equally efficient informationally, then public information is instantly and
simultaneously incorporated into prices. Hence, individual bonds and stocks should tend to be contemporane-
ously correlated, and the direction of this relation is determined by the type of information released over time.
The information on an increase in the firm’s future cash flows should lead to an increase in the stock’s price. In
addition, the firm’s bonds should also increase in value because they are claims on the firm’s cash flows and their
default risk is less. Thus, a positive correlation is expected between the firm’s stock and bond prices. However,
the arrival of information about a risky project with a potentially high return increases the variance in the value
of the assets of the firm but not the risk-adjusted value of the firm (i.e. the higher expected cash flows are now
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discounted more heavily). The default risk of the firm’s bonds now increases and leads to a lower debt value.
But, the value of the stock increases because of the potential to reap a high return. Thus, a negative relation is
expected between the firm’s stock and bond prices. It should also be noted that it is possible that bondsmay lead
in incorporating a particular type of information, such as a change in the probability of default, and lag in incor-
porating another type of information, such as an increase in sales revenue. However, these possible influences
on the stock and the bond returns are not mutually exclusive. Hence, the signs of the estimated coefficients of
the lagged stock returns in my models represent the net effect of these possibilities. Further, in the presence of
information asymmetries, informed traders tend to systematically trade in either the bond or the stock market
because of differences in trading fees, mechanisms, liquidity, institutional constraints, marginal tax brackets,
and insider-related legislation (i.e. disclosure requirements). Thus if private information is not simultaneously
embedded into the prices of the bond and its underlying stock, then a lead-lag relation should exist between
the bond and the stock returns. I examine the lead-lag relation between the bond and the issuing firm’s stock
returns by adopting the following bivariate vector autoregressive (VAR):






siRS,t−i + εt , (1)
where yt is the variable set [RB,t ,RS,t]′, RB,t is the daily return on a bond portfolio at time t, RS,t is the daily
return on the underlying stock portfolio at time t, and L is the lag length. The lag length is set equal to five and
is determined by the Akaike Information Criterion.4 The c, βi, and si are the intercept term and the coefficients
matrices to be estimated respectively, and εt is the error term. I test for stationarity in the daily returns of the two
dependent variables, RB,t and RS,t , using the Augmented Dickey–Fuller, and the Phillips–Perron tests (Dickey
and Fuller 1979; Phillips and Peron 1988). The null hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected by both tests for
the daily time series of all the bond and stock portfolios at the 1% significance level. Further, the Johansen’s
cointegration test (Johansen 1991) rejects the null hypothesis that the retail bond market and the underlying
stock market are cointegrated for the time period I examine. Thus, I use the VAR system instead of a Vector
Error Correction Model system in my analysis. In the interest of brevity, the results of these preliminary tests
are not included in the paper.
The dynamics of how information is embedded into the bond and stock markets is examined by including
the lagging terms in the model. Therefore, if the bonds and the stocks instantly and simultaneously incorporate
information, then I expect the coefficients of all of the lagged terms to be statistically equal to zero. I test this
null hypothesis by examining the Granger (1969) causality test statistic. This statistic is the F-statistic of the null
hypothesis that all estimated lagged coefficients are statistically equal to zero, H0 = [βi] = [Si] = 0, for all i.
The Granger causality test can help to determine whether the stock (bond) returns are important in explaining
the bond (stock) returns. In the case of small samples and to enhance the conclusions made on the basis of the
Granger causality test, Downing, Underwood, and Xing (2009) propose the use of an additional test that tests
whether the sum of the lagged coefficients is statistically equal to zero.5 This ‘Sum’ test is useful because if the
Granger causality is rejected, then a simultaneous rejection gives further support to the hypothesis that a lead-
lag relation exists between the bond and the stock returns. It should be noted that my analysis is not from the
perspective of a structural economic model but from the perspective of the conditional distribution of stock
returns given the bond returns, and bond returns given the stock returns. This is because both stock and bond
returns are endogenous variables in the economy that are jointly determined. It should also be made clear that
the VAR estimated coefficients do not necessarily imply economic causality but instead they aim to document
statistical relation between the stock and bond returns.
The VAR system is estimated with ordinary least squares, and the summary results for the daily returns
stratified by credit rating are presented in Table 4. My results are insensitive to the number of lags used.With the
exception of the Aaa and Ca-D rated bond portfolios, the returns of the bond portfolios exhibit predictability
with the lagged returns of the associated stock portfolios. Although the results for the Aaa and Ca-D rated bond
portfolios might seem surprising at a first glance, there are a number of likely explanations. In particular, the
Aaa bonds are typically followed by a large number of financial analysts, as opposed to lower rated bonds, who




















Table 4. Daily returns of the bond indices and the underlying stock portfolios.
Lagged bond returns Lagged stock returns




Stock 0.033 −0.016 0.065 −0.041 0.029 0.129 −0.048 0.007 0.001 −0.051 1.554 22.476
(0.883) (−0.417) (1.749) (−1.117) (0.789) (10.095) (−3.711) (0.566) (0.103) (−3.971) (0.213) (0.000)
Bond 0.005 −0.015 −0.022 −0.007 0.001 0.034 0.014 0.016 0.015 0.009 2.640 1.150
(0.357) (−1.170) (−1.723) (−0.570) (0.064) (7.705) (3.104) (3.686) (3.268) (1.986) (0.104) (0.331)
Aaa 3278
Stock 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 −0.001 1.809 −2.069 1.292 1.237 −1.373 1990.38 0.978
(1.858) (−0.438) (2.566) (−0.381) (−2.053) (27.704) (−22.026) (12.897) (12.023) (−19.689) (0.000) (0.430)
Bond −0.014 −0.005 0.071 −0.014 −0.016 −0.345 −2.353 4.042 −2.853 2.508 2.190 2.970
(−0.783) (−0.295) (4.029) (−0.807) (−0.922) (−0.154) (−0.730) (1.176) (−0.808) (1.048) (0.139) (0.011)
Aa 2343
Stock −0.088 −0.102 −0.073 −0.120 −0.090 0.039 −0.094 −0.002 0.008 −0.052 13.555 20.643
(−1.406) (−1.642) (−1.171) (−1.929) (−1.477) (1.815) (−4.327) (−0.086) (0.368) (−2.361) (0.000) (0.000)
Bond −0.019 −0.039 0.009 0.031 0.008 0.061 0.026 0.021 0.021 0.008 5.800 2.211
(−0.882) (−1.799) (0.424) (1.438) (0.394) (8.335) (3.443) (2.829) (2.855) (1.128) (0.016) (0.051)
A 3278
Stock −0.074 −0.085 0.032 −0.063 0.068 −0.020 −0.045 0.012 0.002 −0.045 2.549 22.134
(−1.317) (−1.527) (0.575) (−1.143) (1.240) (−1.092) (−2.466) (0.651) (0.097) (−2.461) (0.111) (0.000)
Bond −0.019 −0.027 0.007 0.034 0.031 0.045 0.025 0.029 0.018 0.002 10.844 1.404
(−1.029) (−1.487) (0.364) (1.920) (1.757) (7.753) (4.202) (4.840) (3.124) (0.290) (0.001) (0.220)
Baa 3278
Stock 0.088 −0.009 0.078 −0.049 0.065 0.091 −0.045 −0.001 −0.009 −0.061 1.036 18.059
(1.374) (−0.141) (1.226) (−0.767) (1.020) (5.098) (−2.487) (−0.055) (−0.525) (−3.389) (0.309) (0.000)
Bond 0.007 −0.025 0.004 0.028 0.033 0.031 0.014 0.021 0.013 0.016 12.244 0.983
(0.415) (−1.430) (0.198) (1.588) (1.856) (6.275) (2.723) (4.150) (2.673) (3.250) (0.001) (0.426)
High yield (HY) 3756
Stock 0.028 0.039 0.057 0.088 0.022 0.428 −0.123 0.035 −0.017 −0.045 64.874 100.43







Lagged bond returns Lagged stock returns
Credit rating β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 N Sum Granger
Bond 0.165 0.039 0.030 0.087 0.079 0.131 −0.009 0.023 0.005 0.012 612.24 2.080
(9.728) (2.305) (1.781) (5.137) (4.942) (21.466) (−1.288) (3.465) (0.774) (1.909) (0.000) (0.065)
Ba 3756
Stock −0.122 −0.022 −0.054 0.075 0.015 0.078 0.016 0.009 0.016 −0.037 0.042 63.75
(−1.645) (−0.295) (−0.728) (1.017) (0.218) (4.703) (0.908) (0.551) (0.956) (−2.140) (0.839) (0.000)
Bond 0.128 0.039 0.044 0.053 0.042 0.060 0.019 0.014 0.014 0.007 248.71 0.879
(7.716) (2.323) (2.655) (3.175) (2.630) (16.095) (4.960) (3.747) (3.684) (1.805) (0.000) (0.494)
B 3756
Stock 0.037 −0.065 0.037 0.084 0.041 0.057 0.050 0.011 0.016 −0.033 6.742 77.872
(0.658) (−1.138) (0.659) (1.511) (0.762) (3.357) (2.846) (0.635) (0.893) (−1.892) (0.010) (0.000)
Bond 0.018 0.084 0.082 −0.004 0.104 0.088 0.043 0.008 0.011 0.012 278.58 1.060
(1.075) (5.048) (4.917) (−0.227) (6.568) (17.713) (8.216) (1.512) (2.139) (2.403) (0.000) (0.381)
Caa 3756
Stock 0.039 0.052 0.066 0.039 0.052 0.071 0.035 −0.008 0.008 −0.055 35.228 37.511
(1.412) (1.849) (2.358) (1.386) (1.905) (4.262) (2.100) (−0.459) (0.465) (−3.240) (0.000) (0.000)
Bond 0.077 0.036 0.016 0.069 0.036 0.117 0.048 0.034 −0.002 0.018 226.12 4.226
(4.620) (2.192) (0.954) (4.159) (2.203) (11.930) (4.801) (3.414) (−0.186) (1.813) (0.000) (0.001)
Ca-D 3756
Stock 0.022 0.009 −0.002 0.016 0.029 −0.044 0.000 −0.016 0.022 −0.009 0.422 2.220
(2.447) (1.025) (−0.227) (1.728) (3.154) (−2.700) (0.014) (−0.964) (1.348) (−0.554) (0.516) (0.050)
Bond −0.095 0.001 −0.034 −0.010 −0.013 −0.005 0.030 0.024 −0.052 0.070 1.202 3.657
(−5.796) (0.061) (−2.079) (−0.598) (−0.790) (−0.169) (1.027) (0.830) (−1.792) (2.399) (0.273) (0.002)
Note: Table 4 presents the estimates of the following bivariate VAR model:






siRS,t−i + εt ,
where yt is the variable set [RB,t , RS,t]′ , RB,t is the daily return of the Barclays bond index with a particular credit rating at time t, RS,t is the daily return on the underlying stock portfolio at time t,
and L(= 5) is the lag length. The α is the intercept term, βi and si are the coefficients matrices to be estimated respectively, and εt is the error term. The t-statistics of the coefficient estimates are
given in parentheses below the estimates. The ‘N’ is the number of data points, and ‘Sum’ is the F-statistics (p-value in parenthesis) of the null hypothesis that the sum of the estimated coefficients is
statistically equal to zero. The ‘Granger’ is the F-statistics (p-value in parenthesis) of the null hypothesis that all estimated coefficients are statistically equal to zero.
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environment of the Aaa bonds can be considered to be equally efficient to the associated stocks informational
environment. Typically, Aaa bonds attract the attention of sophisticated institutional investors. These investors
have fast access to relevant information that may affect the value of the assets of the firm, and the liquidity to
transact fast in the market place. Thus, in this highly informational efficient environment, the transactions of
institutional investors will help Aaa rated bonds to incorporate all relevant information as fast as in the case of
the issuing firms stocks. As a consequence, the results from the VAR model do not establish a lead-lag relation
between the Aaa bond and stock returns. Further, the results of the Ca-D rated bond portfolio may be content
with the following reasoning. The low credit rated bonds are closer to default, and their future cash flows, similar
to the equity’s future cash flows, are very sensitive to information related to the value of the firm and less sensitive
to the movements in interest rates. As Merton (1974) notes, the low credit rated bonds behave more similarly
to equity relative to the higher rated bonds. Thus, the arrival of information related to the value of the assets for
the firm is likely to affect contemporaneously both the stock and bond returns. Similar to the case of the Aaa
bonds, the results from the VAR model do not establish a lead-lag relation between the Ca-D rated bond and
stock returns.6
Further, for the IG, Aa, A, Baa, HY, Ba, B, and Caa rating categories there are many statistically signif-
icant coefficients for the stock returns that help to explain the bond returns. For example, for the IG rated
bond portfolio, the coefficients of the five lagged stock portfolio returns take the values of 0.034, 0.014, 0.016,
0.015, and 0.009, with highly significant t-statistics of 7.705, 3.104, 3.686, 3.268, and 1.986 respectively. The
Granger test also rejects the null hypothesis that each of the estimated coefficients is equal to zero; and the
Sum test provides further support for the Aa, HY, B, and Caa rating categories. For example, for the Ba
rated bond portfolio, the Granger test has a value of 0.879 with a p-value of .494, indicating that the returns
of the associate stock portfolio have strong predictive power for the returns of the Ba rated bond portfolio.
These findings indicate that the two markets have equal informational efficiency. However, the results also indi-
cate that the returns of the less safe bond portfolios (e.g. HY, Ba, B, and Caa categories) tend to be more sensitive
to the lagged returns of the underlying stock portfolios. Indeed, the coefficient estimates of the lagged stock
portfolios returns tend to take large values and highly statistically significant t-statistics (e.g. Ba rated bond port-
folio). This observation is expected because the low rated bonds resemble equity more closely than high rated
bonds [for an in-depth discussion of the equity component of low rated bonds see, among others, Fridson (1994)
and Cornell and Green (1991)]. Further, with the exemption of the weak evidence for the Aaa and Ca-D bond
portfolios, there is no statistically significant evidence that the daily bond returns lead the daily stock returns.7
Overall, I find that the daily stock returns lead the bond returns for the IG, Aa, A, Baa, HY, Ba, B, and Caa
rated bond portfolios but not for the safer (Aaa) and the least safe (Ca-D) bond portfolios. The results imply
that the stock market is more efficient when incorporating information that includes information that might
lead to big corporate losses. However, whether the detected lead-lag relation is a causal one is not clear, and
therefore it can be regarded as a joint reaction to common risk factors. Moreover, the more predictable bond
portfolios are issued by firms that tend to have a lower Altman’s z-score. A likely explanation for the lack of equal
informational efficiency is that the arrival of information for the issuing firms in financial distress induces trading
in both bonds and stocks and leads to the observed lead-lag relation between the bond and the stock returns.
My results differ from the results of Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) who find that the informational efficiency
of HY corporate bonds is similar to that of the underlying stocks. However, my results complement Downing,
Underwood, and Xing (2009) and Kwan (1996) who find that the stock market is relatively more efficient than
the bond market, but they also find that this higher informational efficiency varies with respect to the credit
quality of the bonds. The different findings of these studies might be because the costs of the bond transactions
were higher during the time period covered by Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002), and as a result, the information
that induces the trading in the stocks might not have been of a sufficient magnitude to trigger trading in the
firms’ bonds. A further explanationmight be the differences in the depth and liquidity of the stock and the bond
markets. Thus, it is likely that on the arrival of firm-specific information, the stock of a firm attracts the trading
interest of both institutional and private investors mainly due to the depth and liquidity of the stock market,
which leads to a lagged price reaction in the bond market. Other possible reasons include the differences in
the time periods examined, number of bonds, and the types of data used (i.e. bond portfolios versus individual
bonds, daily versus intraday prices).
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3.2. Sensitivity of results to interest rate and equitymarket returns
IG bonds tend to have quite stable expected cash flows and therefore are more sensitive to changes in interest
rates and less correlated with stock returns. On the contrary, the expected cash flows from the HY bonds, which
are more likely to default, are more sensitive to information about the value of the issuing firm and therefore
are more correlated with the stock returns and less sensitive to the changes in the interest rates. In addition, the
HY bonds typically have higher coupon rates than the IG bonds, which implies shorter durations and therefore
less sensitivity to interest rates compared to the IG bonds. Furthermore, as noted by Ramaswami (1991), the HY
bonds are protected by a smaller equity cushion than the IG bonds and therefore are more sensitive to changes
in the value of the issuing form’s corporate assets. In brief, the HY bonds have many equity like qualities, and
their values tend tomove together with the issuing firm’s equity value. This is especially the case with downward
pricemovements because upward pricemovements are truncated. This truncation occurswhen the credit ratings
of a firm improves significantly, because then the firm finds calling the bonds and refinancing at a lower cost
beneficial.
In order to further examine the lead-lag relation between the returns of the bond and the stock portfolios,
I regress the daily returns of the bond portfolios on the lagged daily returns of the bond portfolios and on the
contemporaneous and lagged daily returns of the associated stock portfolios. In order to control for the interest
rate risk and the market-wide risk related to the corporate bonds, I also include the daily returns of default-free8
securities, RDt , of the maturity that is closest to the maturity of the bond portfolio and the daily returns, RMt ,
of the S&P500 index. Specifically, I assume the following return generating process:












βS,iRS,t−i + εt , (2)
whereRB,t is the daily return on a bond portfolio at time t,RT,t−i is the contemporaneous and lagged daily return
of a default-free security of the closest matching maturity to the maturity of the bond portfolio, RS&P,t−i is the
contemporaneous and lagged daily return on the S&P500 index, RS,t−i is the contemporaneous and lagged daily
return of the associated stock portfolio, α is the intercept term, and εt is the error term.
The coefficient βT,i captures the sensitivity of the bond portfolio’s daily returns to changes in the rate of the
default-free securities with similar maturities, the coefficient βS&P,i captures the sensitivity of the bond port-
folios’ daily returns to the stock market’s returns, and the coefficient βS,i captures the sensitivity of the bond
portfolios’ daily returns to the daily returns of the associated stock portfolio.9 I follow Hotchkiss and Ronen
(2002) and Cornell and Green (1991) and only report the sum of the estimated coefficients and not the individ-
ual coefficients because their interpretation might be inappropriate in my context. If the empirical findings of
Downing, Underwood, and Xing (2009), Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002), and Kwan (1996) for the US corporate
bond market also apply to the Barclays bond indices; then I expect that the changes in the rate of the default-
free securities drive the safe bonds and that the stock returns drive the lower rated bonds. Table 5 displays the
summary statistics.
The results support the view that the lower rated bonds (i.e. HY, Ba, B, Caa, and Ca-D) are similar to equity
compared to the higher rated bonds (i.e. IG, Aaa, Aa, A, and Baa). In particular, the bond portfolios rated IG,
Aaa, Aa, A, and Baa appear to be sensitive to the interest ratemovements. The sums of their coefficients are equal
to 0.311, 0.362, 0.311, 0.361, and 0.270 respectively. The associated p-values of the hypotheses that the sums of
the coefficients are statistically equal to zero are below or slightly higher than .05. The results also indicate that
these safer bond portfolios are not really sensitive to the returns of the associated stock portfolios. As expected
the returns of the bond portfolios rated HY, Ba, B, Caa, and Ca-D do not appear to be significantly related to
the returns of the Treasury notes, but they are significantly related to the lagged returns of the associated stock
portfolios. The sums of the coefficients are equal to 0.089, 0.111, 0.213, 0.239, and 0.186, respectively, with the
p-values of the null hypotheses below or slightly above .05. Furthermore, the returns of all of the bond indices
are not significantly related to the returns of the S&P500 index.
My results on the sensitivity of the bond returns to the interest rate and the stock market movements appear
to be in line with the previously reported results. For example, Downing, Underwood, and Xing (2009) regress
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Investment grade (IG) 0.023 (0.751) 0.311 (0.052) 0.068 (0.561) 0.008 (0.489) 0.105
Aaa −0.026 (0.651) 0.362 (0.038) 0.024 (0.881) −0.018 (0.559) 0.068
Aa 0.095 (0.364) 0.311 (0.053) 0.108 (0.651) −0.049 (0.425) 0.092
A 0.206 (0.156) 0.361 (0.066) 0.136 (0.525) −0.044 (0.498) 0.128
Baa 0.243 (0.101) 0.270 (0.089) 0.094 (0.523) 0.003 (0.207) 0.199
High yield (HY) 0.412 (0.054) 0.519 (0.120) 0.338 (0.408) 0.089 (0.114) 0.298
Ba 0.489 (0.019) 0.089 (0.302) −0.021 (0.198) 0.111 (0.055) 0.456
B 0.498 (0.026) 0.096 (0.298) 0.019 (0.355) 0.213 (0.053) 0.512
Caa 0.539 (0.008) −0.052 (0.361) −0.064 (0.288) 0.239 (0.039) 0.503
Ca-D 0.512 (0.002) −0.022 (0.602) −0.111 (0.209) 0.186 (0.044) 0.416
Table 5 presents the estimates of the following regression model:












βS,iRS,t−i + εt ,
where RB,t is the daily return on a Barclays bond index at time t; RT ,t−i is the contemporaneous and lagged daily return of a default-free security
(i.e. Treasury note) of the closestmatchingmaturity to thematurity of the Barclays bond index; RS&P,t−i is the contemporaneous and lagged daily
return on the S&P500 index; RS,t−i is the contemporaneous and lagged daily return of the associated stock portfolio; α is the intercept term; βB,i ,
βT ,i , βS&P,i , and βS,i are coefficients to be estimated; and εt is the error term. The p-values of the null hypothesis that the sum of the estimated
coefficients is statistically equal to zero are given in parentheses.
the daily returns of the bond portfolios with high and low credit ratings on the five-year Treasury note and the
S&P500 index returns and report coefficients of 0.324 and −0.021, respectively, for the AAA rated portfolio
and 0.028 and 0.109, respectively, for the junk rated (i.e. Ca-D) portfolio. Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) report
coefficients of 0.580 and 0.490 for the HY bonds on the daily returns of the Lehman Intermediate Government
Bond index and the S&P500 index respectively. Blume, Keim, and Patel (1991) regress the monthly returns of
the HY bonds on the monthly government bond returns and the small stocks over the period 1982–1989 and
report coefficients of 0.330 and 0.170 respectively. Furthermore, Cornell and Green (1991) regress the monthly
returns of the HY bonds on the Treasury note and the S&P500 index returns and report coefficients of 0.280 and
0.360 respectively over the period of 1960–1989.
These results indicate that there is some predictability in the stock returns for the returns of the lower rated
bond portfolios (i.e. HY, Ba, B, Caa, and Ca-D) but there is no significant predictability on the returns of the
higher rated bondportfolios (i.e. IG,Aaa,Aa,A, andBaa). Furthermore, the lower rated bondportfolios aremore
sensitive to the returns of the associated stock portfolios and the S&P500 index. Moreover, the more predictable
bond portfolios are issued by firms that tend to have a lower Altman’s z-score; a measure of financial distress
with low values indicating higher probabilities of firm bankruptcy (see Table 2 for the Altman’s z-score values of
the Barclays’ bond indices’ associated stock portfolios). A likely explanation for the lack of equal informational
efficiency is that the arrival of firm-specific information for the issuing firms in financial distress induces trading
in both bonds and stocks and leads to the observed lead-lag relation between the bond and the stock returns.
This finding complements the results of Downing, Underwood, and Xing (2009) but differs from the results
of Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002). Downing, Underwood, and Xing (2009) attribute the different findings to the
possible higher transaction costs, the small sample of bonds, and the shorter time period covered in Hotchkiss
and Ronen (2002). These differences might have made trading in the firm’s stock sensible but not in its bonds.
4. Economic significance of results
In this section, I assess whether the relative informational inefficiency of the bond and stock markets has any
economic significance for the market participants. For that reason, I examine whether a profitable strategy can
be devised on the basis of the lead-lag relation between the returns of the stocks and the bonds. I also examine
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whether the relative informational inefficiency of the bonds allows the impending default of the bonds to be
perceived ahead of time.
4.1. Predictability and profitability
The economic significance of the findings can be assessed by examining the performance of the bond portfo-
lios that are formed on the basis of the behavior of the past returns of the individual stocks (i.e. the Barclays
bond indices constituents) using a contrarian strategy described in Cornell and Green (1991) and Jegadeesh
and Titman (1993). In particular, I track, for each credit category, the performance of the bond portfolios that




(Rsi,t−1 − Rm,t−1), (3)
whereN is the number of stocks in the stock portfolio that corresponds to a bond portfolio of a particular credit
rating category, Rsi,t−1 is the daily return on the stock of firm si at time t−1, and Rm,t−1 is the daily return on the
stock portfolio at time t−1 for all of the firms with a bond in a particular credit rating class. This trading strategy
implies that I go long (short) on the bond whose underlying stock has achieved above (below) average returns in
the previous period. In order to assess the economic significance of the lead-lag relation between the daily stock
and bond returns in different credit categories, I track the performance of the resulting bond portfolios over one
day, one week (i.e. five trading days), and one month (i.e. 22 trading days). I also calculate the cumulative return
over the time period of 1 January 2005, to 31 December 2012; a period in which the daily returns are available
for all of the bond portfolios. Assuming no trading costs, if the lead-lag relation between stocks and bonds is
economically significant, then the formed bond portfolios should lead to an excess return.
The results are summarized in Table 6. For all of the holding periods, the average return is close to zero for all
of the credit categories. Consistent with the previous finding that the lower rated bonds tend to bemore sensitive
to movements in their underlying stocks, the most profitability exists in the lower rated portfolios. For example,
when the formed bond portfolio is held for one day, the average return is zero in the Aaa rating category but
the return is 0.005% in the Ca-D rating category. Further, the longer the holding period of the bond portfolio is,
the larger the total return is. For example, for a holding period of one day, the total profit is 0.191% in the Aaa
rating category and 3.798% in the Ca-D rating category; but for 1 month, the total profit is 0.709% in the Aaa
rating category and 9.918% in the Ca-D rating category. However, for most credit categories, a trader is unlikely
to exploit the lead-lag relation between the bonds and stocks. This is because the transaction costs in the bond
market tend to be considerable.10 These costs mean that any potential trading profit is likely be eliminated in
Table 6. Predictability and profitability.
Holding period
Day Week Month
Credit rating Mean (%) Total (%) Mean (%) Total (%) Mean (%) Total (%)
Investment grade (IG) 0.000 0.191 0.000 0.419 0.002 0.709
Aaa 0.000 0.279 −0.001 −0.022 0.002 0.521
Aa −0.000 0.244 −0.001 −0.016 −0.001 −0.019
A 0.000 0.160 0.002 0.489 0.003 1.523
Baa 0.000 0.422 0.003 0.681 0.002 1.629
High yield (HY) 0.003 1.111 0.002 2.481 0.003 4.467
Ba 0.001 1.681 0.003 3.991 0.005 6.201
B 0.003 2.341 0.004 4.763 0.004 7.115
Caa 0.002 2.759 0.002 5.505 0.005 8.625
Ca-D 0.005 3.798 0.003 6.698 0.007 9.918
Note: Table 6 reports the performance (i.e. profit or loss) of the trading strategies based on the bond portfolios that are formed by assigning a
positive (negative) weight to the bonds whose associated stock achieved an above (below) average return over the previous period. The ‘Mean’
gives the average return for the holding period, and the ‘Total’ gives the cumulative return for the period 1 January 2005, to 31 December 2012.
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the long run. These results are qualitatively similar with the results reported by Downing, Underwood, and Xing
(2009).
4.2. Predictability and themarket perception of default
I examine whether the relative informational inefficiency of bonds compared to stocks is useful in predicting
the impending default of the bonds. Hillmer and Yu (1979) propose a statistical technique that is based on the
measurement of the amount of time that the market’s mean and variance of returns takes to reflect the arrival
of new information. By examining the structural changes in these two market attributes, I can determine at
what time the stock and bond markets perceive the impending default of a firm. The market perception time is
defined as the earliest point in time at which the market perceives an impending firm default, and the market
lead interval is the time between the perception time and the actual bankruptcy. If the market lead interval for
stocks is significantly longer than that of bonds, then the investors might have enough time to protect their
capital by selling the risky bonds off well before they default or fall significantly in value.
In order to constructmydata set ofUS corporate defaults, I use the definition of default in Standard andPoor’s
Annual U.S. Corporate Default Study and Rating Transitions report in which default is the firm’s failure to make
a required payment (interest or principal) on its debt obligation, or the filing for bankruptcy, or the initiation
of a distressed exchange offer. I exclude a failure to pay interest on the date it is due but which is made within
the grace period. I also do not consider preferred stock dividends as financial obligations, and therefore do not
consider the failure of the firm to pay a preferred stock dividend as equivalent to firm default (D). My definition
includes firms that have selectively defaulted (SD) and firms that are under regulatory supervision (R) because
of severe worries about their financial condition. The actual time of default is defined as the earliest of (i) the
date the firm filed for bankruptcy, (ii) the date the firm failed to make a required interest or principal payment,
(iii) the date the bond was downgraded to D, SD, or R by S&P, or (iv) the date that the distresses exchange
offer was initiated. I also supplement and double-check my data by searching in the Lexis/Nexis database for
all bankruptcies, corporate defaults, and distressed exchange offering. I use the daily returns of the Barclays
High Yield index that excludes defaults (HYED) for a period of two years before and two years after the default
date.11 For the bonds that defaulted, I calculate the time series of the excess return over the four-year period as
the difference between the return on the bond and the return on the HYED index. Unsurprisingly, the number
of defaults increases as the credit rating of the issuing firms decrease. For example, the number of defaults for
the Aaa rated firms is zero but the number of defaults for the Ca-D rated firms is 173 (Table 7).
The market’s perception time is determined on the basis of the structural changes in the mean and variance
of the return, which are detected using the cumulative sum tests.12 Let Xt be a market behavior variable, return
or variance, of a stock or bond at time period t. I assume that the market behavior variable is a function of an
information set that might contain various pieces of information like earnings reports, merger announcements,
credit rating downgrades, . . . etc. The parameter Xt responds to different pieces of information that arrive at
fixed or random time points. I assume that the information about the default is disclosed at time t2 and that
the market perceives the impending default at time t1. The realization {Xt|t = ts, ts + 1, . . . , t1, t1 + 1, . . . , tm}
is the observed sequence of the market behavior variable (i.e. return or variance) in which ts is some starting
time before t1, and tm is a time after t1 and before t2. Following Hillmer and Yu (1979), I assume that (i) {Xt|t1 <
t ≤ tm} are iid with a known mean of ϑc and a known variance τ 2c , (ii) {Xt|ts ≤ t ≤ t1} are iid with a known
mean of ϑ and a known variance τ 2, and (iii) {Xt|t1 < t ≤ tm} and {Xt|ts ≤ t ≤ t1} are mutually independent. I
also assume that the main effect of the release of the default information is a structural change in the parameter
(i.e. return or variance). The cumulative sum of the deviations, Sk, over a period k of the random processX from








where Yt = Xt − ϑ is the cumulative sum of the deviations from ϑ . Billingsley (1968) shows that if Yt is iid with
a mean μ (equal to zero in this case) and a finite variance τ 2, then Sk is asymptotically a Weiner process with a
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Table 7. Average market lead times of impending defaults.
Average market lead time (months)
Stocks Bonds
Credit rating Time period Defaults Return Variance Return Variance
Investment grade (IG) 02/01/1991–31/12/2010 50 Mean 5.7 3.7 5.0 3.1
Min 1.7 1.3 1.8 2.2
Max 8.8 7.4 7.7 8.8
St. dev 3.9 3.5 3.3 4.1
Aaa 01/06/2002–31/12/2010 0 Mean – – – –
Min – – – –
Max – – – –
St. dev – – – –
Aa 01/01/2006–31/12/2010 7 Mean 3.8 2.7 3.3 2.2
Min 0.8 0.9 1.5 1.3
Max 5.5 4.0 5.2 5.3
St. dev 2.2 1.7 2.1 2.7
A 06/01/2002–31/12/2010 43 Mean 4.3 1.9 4.0 2.0
Min 1.2 0.5 0.9 0.6
Max 8.6 5.1 7.5 4.7
St. dev 4.4 3.2 3.3 1.9
Baa 01/06/2002–31/12/2010 63 Mean 7.0 4.4 6.6 4.7
Min 2.7 1.3 3.1 2.0
Max 11.2 9.1 10.1 9.9
St. dev 5.2 4.6 3.9 4.5
High yield (HY) 01/08/2000–31/12/2010 738 Mean 10.5 6.6 8.4 5.2
Min 2.9 1.9 1.8 1.7
Max 18.2 14.4 23.1 15.3
St. dev 6.9 6.4 9.2 7.7
Ba 01/08/2000–31/12/2010 74 Mean 14.0 8.1 12.2 6.8
Min 5.6 2.7 5.8 2.0
Max 26.3 18.8 21.9 16.1
St. dev 8.4 7.5 8.9 6.4
B 01/08/2000–31/12/2010 172 Mean 13.2 10.4 10.8 8.8
Min 5.6 2.4 4.4 1.9
Max 27.2 22.2 25.5 27.1
St. dev 8.1 8.0 7.3 7.2
Caa 01/08/2000–31/12/2010 561 Mean 16.2 8.5 14.1 6.9
Min 6.7 3.3 5.3 1.6
Max 35.1 21.0 26.3 19.7
St. dev 10.3 7.4 11.1 8.3
Ca-D 01/08/2000–31/12/2010 173 Mean 14.1 9.3 14.6 9.7
Min 6.7 3.3 3.2 1.8
Max 34.4 22.2 26.1 17.7
St. dev 11.2 10.7 10.2 8.1
Note: Table 7 displays the averagemarket lead times of the impending defaults for the whole spectrum of credit ratings. The ‘Market Lead Time’ is
defined as the duration in months between the market perception time and the date of the actual default. The ‘Time Period’ is the time period
over which the information about corporate defaults was collected. For each credit category, this Time Period is defined as the time period that
starts two years after the date’s daily data is available and ends two years before the last date’s daily data is available inmydata set. The ‘Defaults’
is the total number of firm defaults during the associated time period. The number of defaults, the names of the firms that defaulted, and the
actual dates of the defaults are collected from the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) Annual U.S. Corporate Default Study and Rating Transitions reports
for various years and the S&P’s CreditPro database. I also supplement and double-check my data set by conducting a search for bankruptcies,
defaults, and distressed exchange offers in the Lexis/Nexis database. The default date is defined as the date the firm failed to make a required
payment (interest or principal), the date the firmfiled for bankruptcy, or the date the firm initiated a distressed exchange offer. The ‘St. Dev’ is the
standard deviation of the averagemarket lead time for the bonds that belong to a particular credit category. Although the analysis is conducted
using daily data, the market lead time results are expressed in months; for that reason, I make the assumption that each month has 22 trading
days.
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drift μ. Every time the cumulative sum of the deviations changes from zero, then the parameter experiences a
change from ϑ to ϑc. Hillmer and Yu (1979) construct a critical value δk by defining:
Prob (Sj ≤ δj, for j ≤ k|No parameter change) = α, (5)
where a structural change in the parameter for time j ≤ k occurs every time Sj ≤ δj, and the probability of a type
II error is α. In addition, δk = −
√
kτZα/2 where N(Zα/2) = 1 − α/2, N(X) is the standard normal cumulative
distribution function, and α is the confidence level. The time of themarket’s perception of default t1 can then be:
t1 = T − δT
ϑc − ϑ , (6)
whereT is the time that a structural change in the parameter occurs, δT is the critical value at a certain confidence
level, ϑ is the value of the parameter before the structural change, and ϑc is the value of the parameter after the
structural change. The market lead time for both the return and the variance can then be calculated as the
difference between the market’s perception time and the time at which the default takes place, that is, t2 − t1.
The reasoning is that as the market perceives an impending default, the returns of the high risk bonds should
decrease and the variance should increase.
Table 7 displays the results. In general, an impending firm default is perceived by the stock and bondmarkets
well in advance because the default is reflected in the market’s lead times associated with the mean and the
variance of returns. Further, the average market lead times associated with the return and the variance for both
the stocks and the bonds become longer as the credit rating of the firm deteriorates. For example, an impending
default of the really risky firms, Ca-D rated, is perceived as early as 14 months before the actual default while the
market lead time drops to about 4 months for safer bonds, Aa rated. The average market lead times associated
with the return and the variance of both the stocks and the bonds are similar for the firms that are rated IG, Aa,
A, and Baa. This finding indicates that the structural changes in the return and the variance of the stocks and
bonds of the potentially defaulting firms occur at about the same time. For example, a decrease in the expected
return of the stocks and bonds of firms rated Aa is perceived by the stock market 3.8 months and by the bond
market 3.3 months before the actual default. In addition, an increase in the riskiness of the Aa rated firms is
perceived by both the stock and bond markets 2.2 months in advance of the default event. When I examine
riskier bonds (i.e. HY, Ba, B, Caa, and Ca-D rated) the average market lead times are longer for stocks than
bonds. For example, the stock market appears to perceive a decrease in the returns of the stocks of firms that are
likely to default about 2 months earlier than the bond market perceives a decrease in the returns of the bonds
of these firms. Further, the stock market perceives an increase in the riskiness of the stocks of the firms likely
to default about 1.5 months earlier than the bond market perceives an increase in the riskiness of the bonds of
these firms. For example, the average market lead time for the return of the stocks of the firms that have issued
Caa rated bonds is 16.2 months and the variance is 8.5 months. These numbers compare to 14.1 for the return
and 6.9 months for the variance in the bonds.
The existence of significant market lead times for the impending defaults of highly rated firms as well as
the longer market lead times for stocks compared to the market lead times of riskier bonds indicate that bond
holders have enough time to work out of their long positions on bonds or to devise a hedging strategy in order to
protect the value of their investment in the debt market. My results complement Ramaswami (1991, 1987) who
finds that the market lead times of HY bonds are about 10months for the mean and 5months for the variance of
returns. He also argues that these lead times occur because the HY bond market is less informationally efficient
relative to the stock market and/or because bond holders are more optimistic than stock holders.
5. Conclusion
This study contributes to the literature by providing further evidence on how the arrival of common information
in the market place is incorporated into the prices of bonds and the issuing firms’ stocks. My findings indicate
that the daily stock returns lead the daily bond returns for the IG, Aa, A, Baa, HY, Ba, B, and Caa rated bond
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portfolios but not for the safest and the least safe bond portfolios that are rated Aaa and Ca-D. This finding indi-
cates that the stock market is more efficient relative to the bond market in incorporating common information.
However, I also find that the relative efficiency of the bond and stock markets varies with the creditworthiness
of the bond portfolio examined. Furthermore, my results and inferences are based on data from bond indices,
whichmeans that they should be interpreted with caution. For example, Downing, Underwood, andXing (2009)
examine individual corporate bonds and find substantial cross-sectional variation, which indicates that there are
both predictable and unpredictable bonds in each credit rating category. In addition, the detected lead-lag rela-
tion is not clearly a causal one, and therefore it might be regarded as a joint reaction to common risk factors. The
differences between my results and Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002), Ronen and Zhou (2013), and Bittlingmayer
and Moser (2014) might be because of differences in the data used (e.g. bonds indices versus individual bonds,
sample size, time period covered, portfolios construction, size of transaction costs).
In terms of the economic significance of my results, although it is possible to devise economically significant
trading strategies based on the lead-lag relation between stocks and bonds, the high transaction costs likely only
make sensible the transactions on bonds that are highly sensitive to the release of common information (i.e. low
rated bonds). For the lower rated firms, I also find that the averagemarket lead times for their impending defaults
associated with the mean and variance of their stocks are longer compared to the average market lead times for
the bonds in the same rating category. The existence of a longer lead time implies that bond holders have plenty
of time to get out of their long positions in potentially defaulting bonds or to devise hedging strategies to protect
the value of their investment in the debt market.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1. The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA, www.sifma.org) reports that at the end of 2012 the size of
the US corporate debt market was $9.1 trillion and that the 2012 average daily trading volume was $16.7 billion. In addition,
during 2012, $1.37 trillion of new US corporate debt was issued.
2. Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007) examine the US Over-the-Counter (OTC) corporate bond market and find that greater
informational efficiency is likely to lead to lower transaction costs.
3. Matrix pricing is an approach used to price bonds for which continuous posting of bid-ask prices is not available and therefore,
actual prices do not exist. In this case, traders need to guess the price at which an activemarket will clear, and banks usually price
a bond with an interpolation approach that uses liquid bonds with similar characteristics to the illiquid bond to be priced. Hong
andWarga (2000) report that the bid prices of the Lehman Brothers bonds have fewer price discrepancies from transaction data
compared to the bid prices of bonds traded on the NYSE’s Automated Bond System.
4. The AIC assesses the overall quality of a statistical model by taking into account the number of parameters to be estimated as
well as the goodness of fit of the model to the empirical data. Thus, starting from a number of candidate models for the data,
the AIC can be used to determine the ‘true’ model.
5. This test is known as the Wald’s test and is typically used to test the joint significance of a number of estimated coefficients.
6. Further, these results might also be partially explained on the basis of the arguments by Alexander, Edwards, and Ferrin (2000),
Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002), and Downing, Underwood, and Xing (2009) who attribute conflicting findings on the relation
between the bond and the stock market to the opaque nature of the corporate bond market, the lack of comprehensive data,
different trading mechanisms, and to the complex relation between the returns of a firm’s stock and its publicly traded debt.
Indeed, Connolly, Stivers, and Sun (2005) find that stock market uncertainty has important cross-market pricing effects in the
stock and bond markets. Further, Barsky (1989) reports similar findings and he also argues that reduced productivity growth
has a perverse effect on the relation between stock and bond returns.
7. Prompted by the referee I have also examined whether differences in the trading volume of the bond and stock markets might
affect the results reported in the paper. The results obtained from an augmented VAR model which also includes the lagged
trading volumes for both the bond and stock portfolios indicate that my findings are not affected by differences in liquidity
between the bonds and stocks. In the setting of my paper this is not a surprise because the use of bond indices helps to mitigate
problems related to extreme differences in liquidity in the bonds in my sample, as well as problems related to non-synchronous
data and stale quotes. In the interest of brevity these results are not reported in the paper but they are available upon request.
8. I use Treasury notes with different maturities. Downing, Underwood, and Xing (2009) use the five-year Treasury note because
it is the most heavily traded Treasury note, but they also report that their conclusions are insensitive to the maturity of the
Treasury note used. Kwan (1996) matches bonds with risk-free interest rates by interpolation using the yields of T-bills with
THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF FINANCE 865
constant maturity, while Blume, Keim, and Patel (1991) construct risk-free bond prices by calculating the price of a portfolio of
government bonds that matches closely the cash flows of the bonds.
9. This approach allows me to take into account the autocorrelation in the return structure of the bond and the stock portfolios.
FollowingHotchkiss and Ronen (2002) andDowning, Underwood, and Xing (2009), I useHansen’s (1982) GeneralizedMethod
of Moments to take into account the problems related to the possible presence of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in the
error terms.
10. For example, Edwards,Harris, andPiwowar (2007) report round-trip transaction costs of about 124 basis points for a transaction
of $20,000 and 48 basis points for a transaction of $200,000 in the US OTC corporate bond market; however, their estimates
vary considerably from 150 basis points for the smallest trade sizes to about 8 basis points for the largest trade sizes [similar
results are reported by Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2007) Hong and Warga (2000), Harris and Piwowar (2006), Schultz
(2001), and Chakravarty and Sarkar (2003)].
11. I use the Barclays High Yield index that excludes defaults because I want to use a proxy for the HY debt market returns that does
not include the impact of bonds that defaulted; otherwise I could double count the defaults. This approach is similar to Hardsky
and Long (1989) and Ramaswami (1991) who use the monthly returns of the Blume–Keim index of lower grade bonds.
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